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EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND 
INCOME INEQUALITY 
DANIEL J. MORRISSEY* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores the connection between exorbitant executive 
compensation and the growing income inequality in our country. It dis-
cusses the traditional legal attempts to rein in corporate remuneration as 
well as the more recent “Say-on-Pay” right given to shareholders in the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010. The Article concludes that neg-
ative stockholder votes can be evidence that directors have breached their 
fiduciary duties by granting overly generous pay hikes to their top officials. 
                                                 
* Daniel J. Morrissey is a professor and former dean at Gonzaga University Law School. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Executive compensation has reached scandalous levels at many public 
companies, making it the number one problem in corporate law.1 As a major 
factor in the growing income inequality in America, it is even more signif-
icantly a threat to the economic well-being of our nation.2 Things were not 
this way especially during the widespread prosperity that followed the Second 
World War.3 During the last several decades, however, as the living standards 
of most Americans have remained stagnant or gone backwards, top corpo-
rate pay has grown to outrageous proportions.4 This Article will first pre-
sent statistical evidence on this soaring remuneration and its consequences 
on the general quality of life in our country.5 It will then discuss the classic 
legal treatment of this problem under both state corporate law and the fed-
eral securities laws,6 and describe why leading scholars and public commen-
tators believe it is inadequate.7 
The Article will then address the most current legislative response to this 
problem: the Say-on-Pay section of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank).8 This provision requires 
all public companies to afford their shareholders a nonbinding advisory vote 
on the compensation they pay to their top officials.9 The Article will then 
present the results of those plebiscites during 2011, the measure’s first year 
of operation. The results have dismayed a number of corporate critics since 
the majority of shareholders of only a few firms disapproved of their exec-
utives’ pay packages.10 
Despite this overall disappointment, more than 50% of the shareholders 
did cast negative ballots at firms whose officers were afforded lush com-
pensation despite poor performance.11 When boards did not rescind their 
                                                 
1 See discussion infra Part V. 
2 See infra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
3 See infra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 22–32 and accompanying text. 
5 See discussion infra Parts I–V. 
6 See discussion infra Part VI.A–B. 
7 See discussion infra Part VI.C. 
8 See discussion infra Part VII. 
9 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010). 
10 See discussion infra Part VIII. 
11 Edward F. Greene, Say-on-Pay and the Business Judgment Rule, THE HARVARD L. 
SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Nov. 26, 2011, 9:52 AM), http://blogs 
.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/11/26/say-on-pay-and-the-business-judgment-rule/ (highlight-
ing a few of the over forty companies in which the majority shareholder vote was negative); 
see also Teamsters Local 237 Additional Sec. Benefit Fund v. McCarthy, No. 2011-CV-197841, 
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officers’ compensation packages, stockholders at several of the companies 
brought derivative suits citing their “No” votes as evidence that there was 
no justification for those pay hikes.12 They therefore alleged that the board 
of directors should be held liable for their waste of corporate assets and 
breach of their fiduciary duties.13 As of early 2012, one federal court has 
sustained such a claim by placing the allegations of excessive pay in the 
context of the exorbitant income inequality that it fosters.14 
The Article will conclude by pointing out the beneficial effects of such 
a judicial decision.15 Such a ruling will not only restrain outlandish corpo-
rate remuneration, which is virtually theft from shareholders, but it can also 
benefit our society in other ways. If those payments to executives, along 
with other sizeable amounts that corporations are now hoarding,16 were 
either distributed to shareholders or put to other productive uses, they would 
expedite our country’s economic recovery. The economy would then pro-
mote prosperity for the large part of its citizens by expanding output and 
creating good paying jobs. 
I. ECONOMIC DISPARITIES AND WEALTH CONCENTRATION IN AMERICA 
The gap between wealthy Americans and the rest of its citizens is now 
a daunting reality. Study after study confirms that the current disparity of 
wealth in America is frightening17—much more of a factor than at any time 
since the Great Depression.18 As this gulf has continued to widen in the last 
                                                                                                                         
2011 WL 4836230, at *2–3 (Ga. Super. Ct. Sept. 15, 2011) (showing that shareholders have 
shown their disapproval of high compensation for executives despite the company’s poor 
performance by casting negative ballots in Dodd-Frank votes). 
12 Gordon v. Goodyear, No. 12 C 369, 2012 WL 2885695, at *1, *4 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 
2012); see also Laborers’ Local v. Intersil, No. 5:11-CV-04093 EJD, 2012 WL 762319, at *1–2 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2012); Plumbers Local No. 137 Pension Fund v. Davis, No. 03:11-633-
AC, 2012 WL 104776, at *2 (D. Or. Jan. 11, 2012); Teamsters, 2011 WL 4836230, at *2–3. 
13 Gordon, 2012 WL 2885695, at *1, *4; Laborers’ Local, 2012 WL 762319, at *1–2; 
Plumbers Local, 2012 WL 104776, at *1; Teamsters, 2011 WL 4836230, at *2–3. 
14 NECA-IBEW Pension Fund ex rel. Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Cox, 1:11-CV-451, 2011 
WL 4383368, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2011); see also discussion infra Part IX.B. 
15 See discussion infra Part X. 
16 See John Carney, Solving the Mystery of Corporate Cash Hoarding, CNBC (June 6, 
2011, 10:28 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/43293840/Solving_the_Mystery_of_Corporate 
_Cash_Hoarding (discussing corporate hording of cash as opposed to paying out dividends). 
17 See CSEA Monroe County, N.Y. Local 828, Income Inequality Is America’s 21st 
Century Monster, THE VOICE REPORTER (May 6, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://voiceforthemembers 
slate.blogspot.com/2011/05/income-inequality-is-americas-21st.html (citing reports that sug-
gest “that income inequality in the United States equals that of Uganda”). 
18 Id. (citing statistics published by the Central Intelligence Agency, available at https:// 
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (follow “Select a Country 
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several years, it has become increasingly apparent that a large part of it is 
a result of exorbitant compensation paid to top corporate officials.19 
Things were not always this way, particularly in the immediate post-
war era. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the American economy was 
growing at a rapid clip and the incomes of all families increased on average 
by about 3%.20 Yet a recent study by economists from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) and the Federal Reserve shows that the 
pay of top corporate executives during those decades remained steady, in-
creasing by less than 1% per year.21 Business leaders of that time period 
did not have to be overpaid to lead their companies to larger profits. 
Around 1970, however, things began to change. In the next three dec-
ades, earnings of the top 1%, the “working rich,”22 increased by three 
times, while the growth of the average family’s real income during those 
thirty years was below 15%.23 Corroborating these numbers was a study by 
the Congressional Budget Office that showed the after-tax income, adjusted 
for inflation, of the top 1% of American families jumped 139% from 1979 
to 2001.24 By contrast, “[t]he income of the middle fifth rose by just 17 per-
cent, to $43,700, and the income of the poorest fifth rose only 9 percent.”25 
By 2007 even President George W. Bush acknowledged this disparity, 
stating: “[t]he fact is that income inequality is real—it’s been rising for more 
than 25 years.”26 In that year the top 10% of American earners garnered 
                                                                                                                         
or Location” hyperlink, select “UNITED STATES”; then click “Economy : UNITED 
STATES” to expand those statistics)). 
19 Peter Whoriskey, With Executive Pay, Rich Pull Away from Rest of America, WASH. 
POST (June 18, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/with-executive 
-pay-rich-pull-away-from-rest-of-america/2011/06/13/AGKG9jaH_story.html. 
20 See Jordan Weissman, 60 Years of American Economic History, Told in 1 Graph, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2012, 3:17 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/08 
/60-years-of-american-economic-history-told-in-1-graph/261503/ (discussing a graph created 
as part of a study undertaken by the Pew Research Center). 
21 Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-
Term Perspective, 1936–2005, at 7 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 35, 
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 972399. 
22 The term “working rich” is borrowed from Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The 
Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States, 4 (last updated by author Mar. 2012) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2010.pdf. 
23 Robert H. Frank, Gauging the Pain of the Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2011, 
at BU7. 
24 Janny Scott & David Leonhardt, Shadowy Lines That Still Divide, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 15, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/15/national/class/OVERVIEW-FINAL.html 
?pagewanted=all. 
25 Id. 
26 Michael Abramowitz & Lori Montgomery, Bush Addresses Income Inequality, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 1, 2007, at A4 (quoting President George W. Bush) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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almost 50% of the country’s total wages, a level higher than any time 
since the start of World War I.27 Statistics on wealth distribution from then 
were even more alarming. “As of 2007, the top 1% of households (the up-
per class) owned 34.6% of all privately held wealth, and the next 19% (the 
managerial, professional, and small business stratum) had 50.5%.”28 Just 
one-fifth of our citizens therefore controlled over 85% of the country’s 
wealth. The bottom two quintiles, by contrast, owned only 0.3%.29 The ef-
fects of that prosperity gap were harshest on children whose poverty rate 
was twice that of adults.30 
Yet social scientists were unsure of what was driving that growing gap 
because, until recently, they did not have the data to determine who really 
comprised the upper echelon of America’s earners. A new study by leading 
economists has established that most of the income gain during those dec-
ades was reaped by corporate executives and financiers.31 “The top 0.1 per-
cent of earners make about $1.7 million or more, including capital gains.”32 
The current Great Recession has finally put this disturbing situation in 
the public spotlight.33 Average Americans have been hurt much more se-
verely by the recent financial meltdown than wealthy Americans, thus 
making the maldistribution of society’s resources even more acute. The 
net worth of the median family has dropped an “astounding” 36.1% since 
2008 whereas the asset values of the top 1% have fallen off by only 
11%—widening the prosperity gap even more.34 
Even though most Americans may not know the full extent of income 
inequality in the country,35 economists, pundits, and bloggers are now 
writing and commenting at length on this injustice.36 Comparing America 
to other countries with stratified social classes, New York Times column-
ist Nicholas Kristof wrote, “[m]aybe that’s why the growing inequality in 
America pains me so. The wealthiest 1 percent of Americans already have 
                                                 
27 Saez, supra note 17, at 2. 
28 G. William Domhoff, Wealth, Income, and Power, WHO RULES AMERICA?, http:// 
sociology.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html (last updated Feb. 2013). 
29 Id. 
30 Gregory Acs & Megan Gallagher, Income Inequality Among America’s Children, 
NEW FEDERALISM: NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICA’S FAMILIES 1 (Jan. 2000). 
31 See Whoriskey, supra note 19, at A16. 
32 Id. 
33 See Maxwell Strachan, 15 Facts About U.S. Income Inequality That Everyone Should 
Know, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011 
/04/05/us-inequality-infographic_n_845042.html#s261411&title=Wage_Inequality (last updated 
June 5, 2011, 6:12 AM). 
34 Domhoff, supra note 28. 
35 See id. 
36 Strachan, supra note 33. 
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a greater net worth than the bottom 90 percent, based on Federal Reserve 
data.”37 As Nobel Prize winning economist Joseph E. Stiglitz commented 
in May 2011 in an article for Vanity Fair: “Americans have been watching 
protests against oppressive regimes that concentrate massive wealth in the 
hands of an elite few. Yet in our own democracy, 1 percent of the people 
take nearly a quarter of the nation’s income—an inequality even the 
wealthy will come to regret.”38 
Contrasting the better productivity of American workers with those in 
European countries, labor lawyer Thomas Geoghegan notes: 
Technically, we seem far ahead, but don’t drool. The U.S. superrich gob-
ble well over two-thirds of the increase. In 2005, the real hourly wage for 
production workers in America was approximately 8 percent lower than 
it was in 1973, while our national output per hour is 55 percent higher. So 
it’s dubious whether most Americans have gained even a penny in pur-
chasing power since 1989.39 
In short, much of the gain in productivity by American workers has gone 
not to the folks who actually generated the wealth but to the upper echelon 
of the managerial class. 
Along the same lines, Cornell University economist Robert H. Frank 
has created a “toil index” to measure the real costs of consumption such as 
paying the rent on a median priced home.40 The hours of work needed by 
the average American to meet that expense declined slightly from 1950 to 
1970 to just 41.5 per month.41 By 2000, however, that figure had risen to 
67.4 hours per month.42 While the rise in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
showed a general increase in wealth during the last several decades,43 av-
erage Americans were going backward in the hours of labor they had to 
expend to meet their basic needs. 
By fall 2011, the general discontent with this widespread unfairness 
gave rise to a spontaneous populist protest. It “began with a few dozen 
demonstrators pitching tents on Wall Street in front of the New York 
Stock Exchange .... Soon hundreds that included union activists joined 
them in a nearby park and the movement spread to a number of cities 
                                                 
37 Nicholas D. Kristof, Our Fantasy Nation?, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2011, at WK9. 
38 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 5, 2011), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/society/features/2011/05/top-one-percent-201105. 
39 THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WERE YOU BORN ON THE WRONG CONTINENT? 13 (2010). 
40 See Frank, supra note 23. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See id. 
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around the country.”44 One organizer in Los Angeles said, “the protesters 
were united in their desire for a more equal economy.”45 If the Occupy 
Wall Street Movement accomplished nothing else, it has “brought that 
stark unfairness to the full attention of the American public.”46 
II. THE REASONS FOR THE RISE IN WEALTH CONCENTRATION 
One academic commentator observing this situation put it aptly: “the 
rising tide of economic growth no longer lifts all boats.”47 There seems to be 
a consensus among economists and others as to why this is so. As President 
George W. Bush explained, “[t]he reason is clear: We have an economy that 
increasingly rewards education and skills because of that education.”48 
As a report on National Public Radio (NPR) put it, “[n]ew technology 
has made many jobs obsolete, while creating dramatic opportunities for 
wealth in computers, finance, and media and entertainment.”49 A study on 
world trade also concluded that “innovations ... have favored workers with 
greater skill and reduced the value of unskilled labor.... Liberal trade with 
the newly industrializing countries of the world has certainly played a part 
in worsening the job prospects of America’s unskilled workers.”50 
Professor Stiglitz thus summed up similar conclusions by a number of 
his colleagues in the dismal science: 
[L]aborsaving technologies have reduced the demand for many “good” 
middle-class, blue-collar jobs. Globalization has created a worldwide 
marketplace, pitting expensive unskilled workers in America against 
cheap unskilled workers overseas. Social changes have also played a 
role—for instance, the decline of unions, which once represented a 
third of American workers and now represent about 12 percent.51 
                                                 
44 Christopher Ram, It Is 0.01%, Not 1%—Part 1, CHRISRAM.NET (June 24, 2012, 
12:00 AM), http://www.chrisram.net/?p=959. 
45 Erick Eckholm & Timothy Williams, Anti-Wall Street Protests Spreading to Cities 
Large and Small, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, at A18 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
46 Ram, supra note 44. 
47 Hugh Heclo, Growing Income Inequalities in America?, 111 POL. SCI. Q. 523, 524 
(1996). 
48 Abramowitz & Montgomery, supra note 26, at A4. For a fine recent piece making 
that same point, see Adam Davidson, Making It in America, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 2012, at 70. 
49 Uri Berliner, Haves and Have-Nots: Income Inequality in America, NPR (Feb. 5, 2007, 
1:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7180618. 
50 Gary Burtless, Worsening American Income Inequality: Is World Trade to Blame?, 14 
THE BROOKINGS REV., 26, 31 (1996). 
51 Stiglitz, supra note 38; see also Davidson, supra note 48, at 70 (“[Because of] the dou-
ble shock we’re experiencing now—globalization and computer-aided industrial productivity ... 
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But Stiglitz was also quick to add another, less excusable cause: “[b]ut 
one big part of the reason we have so much inequality is that the top 1 per-
cent want it that way .... Wealth begets power, which begets more wealth.”52 
Stiglitz went on to cite low tax rates, particularly on gains from investments, 
as a principal reason why America’s rich have become richer while most 
of their countrymen have stagnated or slid lower in terms of economic 
well-being.53 
As the NPR report noted, wealthy people own stocks and upper eche-
lon corporate employees often get a good portion of their compensation in 
stock options.54 Since the Bush Tax Changes of 2003, the appreciation of 
shares, which has been substantial during the past ten years, has been 
taxed at only 15%—much lower than the top bracket on earned income.55 
As Professor Stiglitz also noted, corporate wealth evidenced in share 
prices has been augmented by relaxed antitrust enforcement and by interna-
tional competition for businesses, which has weakened environmental laws 
and labor rights.56 He also points out how manipulation of our financial sys-
tem has generated much of the recent, immense wealth.57 The government, 
through lax regulation, condoned much of that manipulation and then came 
in to rescue banks like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Staley with expensive 
bailouts that were deemed necessary to ward off an even greater recession.58 
III. VANISHING ECONOMIC MOBILITY 
Hand-in-hand with concentration of wealth and the decline in the living 
standards of most Americans has gone the demise of one important part of 
the American dream: the promise of rising social and material benefits for 
                                                                                                                         
income inequality is growing, as the rewards for being skilled grow and the opportunities 
for unskilled Americans diminish.”). 
52 Stiglitz, supra note 38. 
53 See id.; see also Editorial, The 1% and That 15%, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2012, at A22 
(comparing the 15% cap on the taxation of investment income with the 25%–35% rate ap-
plied to the wage and salary income of American workers). 
54 See Berliner, supra note 49. 
55 The 1% and That 15%, supra note 53, at A22. The tax reforms enacted in early 2013 
have raised the long term capital gains tax now to 20% for high income taxpayers. Laura 
Sanders, High Earners Facing First Major Tax Increase in Years, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2013, 
at A1. 
56 See Stiglitz, supra note 38. 
57 See id. For the author’s description of how that fraudulent conduct brought about 
the economic debacle of 2008, see Daniel J. Morrissey, After the Meltdown, 45 TULSA L. 
REV. 393, 397–400 (2010). 
58 See Paul M. Barrett, Bubble Beater, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011, at BR13 (reviewing 
WILLIAM D. COHAN, MONEY AND POWER (2011)). 
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the next generation. As two New York Times reporters described this tra-
ditional belief: “There are poor and rich in the United States, of course, the 
argument goes; but as long as one can become the other, as long as there is 
something close to equality of opportunity, the differences between them 
do not add up to class barriers.”59 The renowned social historian Francis 
Fukuyama has recently made much the same point: 
Inequality per se has never been a big problem in American political 
culture, which emphasizes equality of opportunity rather than of out-
comes. But the system remains legitimate only as long as people believe 
that by working hard and doing their best, they and their children have 
a fair shot at getting ahead, and that the wealthy got there playing by 
the rules.60 
Professor Fukuyama continues, however, with this chilling assessment: 
The fact is, however, that rates of intergenerational social mobility are 
far lower in the United States than many Americans believe them to be, 
and lower than in many other developed countries that traditionally have 
been regarded as rigid and stratified. Over time elites are able to protect 
their positions by gaming the political system, moving their money off-
shore to avoid taxation, and transmitting these advantages to their chil-
dren through favored access to elite institutions.61 
Studies of inheritance patterns at elite colleges bear out this disappoint-
ing conclusion about the lack of social and economic mobility. “According 
to a study published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, only 1.6% 
of Americans receive $100,000 or more in inheritance.”62 “Another 1.1% 
receive $50,000 to $100,000,” but an astonishing 91.1% have older relatives 
who cannot leave them anything.63 A 2010 study by Georgetown University 
of the country’s most selective colleges found that “only 15 percent of stu-
dents came from the bottom half of the income distribution,” whereas over 
two-thirds came from the wealthiest quarter of households.64 
                                                 
59 Scott & Leonhardt, supra note 24. 
60 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER 8–9 (2011). 
61 Id. at 9 (citation omitted); see also Timothy Noah, The Mobility Myth, NEW REPUBLIC, 
Mar. 1, 2012, at 14 (elaborating on the thesis that “[m]ost of Western Europe today is both 
more equal in incomes and more economically mobile than the United States”). 
62 Domhoff, supra note 28. 
63 Id. 
64 David Leonhardt, Top Colleges, Largely for the Elite, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2011, 
at B1, B9. As one social critic recently put it, “[t]he haves in our society are increasingly co-
cooned in a system that makes it easy for their children to continue to be haves.” Charles 
Murray, Narrowing the New Class Divide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2012, at A31. 
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IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INEQUALITY 
There is some debate about the ramifications of this vanishing eco-
nomic mobility. One author comments that the possibility of disparate 
economic results can motivate people to work harder.65 If everyone was 
compensated the same amount regardless of what they did for society, 
many folks might not feel compelled to be productive.66 Another supposed 
benefit of lower wages, at least in the global economy, is that they allow 
Americans to purchase goods cheaper, which can contribute to a higher 
standard of living.67 
From the perspective of psychology and cognitive science, Professor 
Tyler Cowen adds insight about the causes of inequality. It results less, he 
suggests, from the low-paid workers at the bottom of the economic ladder 
than from the small population of brilliant inventors and business people 
situated at the top.68 “The root cause of income inequality, viewed in the 
most general terms,” he says, “is extreme human ingenuity, albeit of a 
perverse kind. That is why it is so hard to control.”69 
Yet one does not have to be a radical egalitarian to see the adverse 
consequences that such a state of affairs will ultimately have for American 
society. Professor Fukuyama notes, “the rising levels of populist anger on 
both the Right and Left ... contribute to polarization and reflect a social 
reality at odds with the country’s own legitimating principles.”70 The title of 
                                                 
65 See Catherine Rampell, Thy Neighbor’s Wealth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2011, at BR17 
(reviewing BRANKO MILANOVIC, THE HAVES AND THE HAVE-NOTS (2010)). 
66 Id. (discussing Milanovic’s suggestion that “[t]he possibility of unequal economic 
outcomes motivates people to work harder ... although at some point it can lead to the pres-
ervation of acquired positions, which causes economies to stagnate”). 
67 See Strachan, supra note 33. 
68 See Tyler Cowen, The Inequality That Matters, THE AM. INTEREST, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 37. 
69 See id.; see also ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
10 (5th ed. 2011). To sum up the root cause of income inequality, it states: 
Before the creation of the corporate structure, there were few opportu-
nities for individuals to make dramatic changes in status and wealth. 
However, corporate history is filled with people like Henry Ford, Walt 
Disney, Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, and Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, who 
changed the world and made themselves and their investors rich. The 
American system has provided opportunity for immigrants from Andrew 
Carnegie to Google’s Sergey Brin to create almost unimaginable wealth. 
Id. 
70 FUKUYAMA, supra note 60, at 8. For trenchant comments about how hard times have 
brought about a resurgence of right-wing politics, see generally THOMAS FRANK, PITY THE 
BILLIONAIRE (2012). 
12 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:001 
Professor Stiglitz’s recent piece, Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%,71 is a 
play on that point. Economic inequality could even affect the physical health 
of American society, as columnist David Brooks cites Richard Wilkinson 
and Kate Pickett for the finding that, “[i]nequality and a feeling of exclu-
sion causes social pain, which leads to more obesity, worse health outcomes, 
fewer social connections, more depression and anxiety.”72 
Others see a similar threat to the general welfare. Conservative former 
Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, has recently noted that our un-
equal economy is “very distorted.”73 Another commentator has pointed out 
the disturbing lack of empathy among its winners for those who are less 
fortunate.74 The plutocrats, she says, who have emerged from this winner-
take-all system, are now increasingly a global class to themselves, without 
any particular allegiance to citizens from their homeland.75 Many seem to 
suggest that the trials of the American working class are their own fault.76 
Caveats about the corrosive effects of great wealth are as old as the 
Scriptures. There is a corresponding lesson that we are all in this together. 
As Dr. Stiglitz writes, “looking out for the other guy isn’t just good for the 
soul—it’s good for business.”77 Consumer demand and purchasing power 
drive our economy and make it possible for businesses to flourish.78 
Along those lines, fears abound about the rise of a new, very large under-
class comprised of white men.79 This group has grown in the post-industrial 
economy as wages for working people have been going down since 1983 
and longer than that for blue-collar males.80 This startling decline was com-
pounded by “the Great Recession, during which three-quarters of the 8 
million jobs lost were lost by men.”81 As David Brooks summed up this 
alarming state of affairs, “[t]he American working class—those without a 
college degree—is being decimated, economically and socially.”82 
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V. SOARING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
Contrast the stark reality of difficult economic times for many Americans 
with the current good fortune enjoyed by business leaders. In 1965, the typ-
ical American CEO made 24 times the average worker.83 By 2007, that dif-
ferential had increased by more than tenfold to 275,84 and it has continued to 
grow. According to a study by the American Federation of Labor and Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the compensation of CEOs 
at America’s 300 largest companies in 2010 was 343 times the average 
worker’s pay.85 While the average American worker earned $46,742 in 
2010, a 2% rise from 2009, and unemployment remained shockingly high, 
the compensation of Standard & Poor (S&P) 500 CEOs was $12 million, 
up 18% over the same time period.86 Commenting on this huge pay differ-
ential, Eleanor Bloxham from the Value Alliance stated, “[i]t’s insane .... 
Corporate boards have bought into the idea that they have to pay up for 
performance. There’ll be more of the same until institutional investors de-
cide CEOs aren’t worth what they’re being paid.”87 
As has been said, executive pay has not always surged so far beyond 
the wages of working people.88 Even during the fast-growing post-war 
decades, it remained level.89 Since the 1980s, it has zoomed upward,90 
fueled in large part by the increased use of incentive pay comprised of 
stock options and bonus awards allegedly tied to firm performance.91 
Those mechanisms for compensation became dominant in 1992 when 
Congress, alarmed that the average CEO’s pay had risen to what today 
                                                 
83 David Owen, The Pay Problem: What’s to Be Done About CEO Compensation, THE 
NEW YORKER, Oct. 12, 2009, at 58. 
84 Id. 
85 Jennifer Liberto, CEOs Earn 343 Times More than Typical Workers, CNN MONEY 
(Apr. 20, 2011, 7:46 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/19/news/economy/ceo_pay/index.htm. 
86 Gary Strauss, Stock Options Help CEOs Cash In, USA TODAY, July 8, 2011, at 1A; 
see also Joann S. Lublin, CEO Pay in 2010 Jumped 11%, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2011, at B1. 
87 Strauss, supra note 86 (quoting Eleanor Bloxham). Outrage over exorbitant executive 
pay is not limited to the United States. Recently the conservative prime minister of Great 
Britain, David Cameron, said that large pay packages awarded to executives in Great Britain 
during a time of general austerity, “made people’s blood boil.” Julia Werdigier, In Britain, 
Rising Outcry over Executive Pay That Makes ‘People’s Blood Boil,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
2012, at B5. 
88 See Owen, supra note 83, at 58 and accompanying text. 
89 Frydman & Saks, supra note 21, at 2. 
90 Id. at 1. 
91 Carole Frydman & Dirk Jenter, CEO Compensation, 2 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 75 (2010), 
available at http://web.mit.edu/frydman/OldFiles/www/COMP%20SURVEY%2008-02-10.pdf. 
14 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:001 
seems a very modest $750,000,92 capped the deductibility of executive com-
pensation at $1 million.93 Then, according to Nell Minow, the leader of a re-
search firm dedicated to improving corporate governance,94 “[t]he first thing 
that happened was that everybody got a raise to a million dollars. The second 
was that companies started issuing bazillions [sic] of options.”95 
Minow continued her critique: “[o]ptions are intended to reward execu-
tives for increasing their company’s market capitalization—a benefit for all 
shareholders. But executives have turned out to be ingenious at eliminating 
any personal risk, turning options into corporate play money, and helping 
to inaugurate the ongoing proliferation of American billionaires.”96 Com-
pensation by options has been easy to game, most notoriously by the wide-
spread practice of executives backdating the grant dates of their options.97 
Even leaving aside that patently illegal practice, there are plenty of other 
ways that corporate officials can manipulate those awards in order to engi-
neer exorbitant compensation for themselves. For instance, they need only 
have their firms issue them stock and options when the prices of those finan-
cial instruments are historically depressed. Just recently, during the market’s 
low point in late 2008 and late 2009, more than 90% of the CEOs at S & P’s 
top 500 companies received large amounts of those securities.98 When stock 
prices rebounded in spring 2011, those awards netted them $3 billion.99 In 
addition, that surge gave American executives more billions in gains on the 
stocks and options they already held. Commenting on that remuneration, 
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Paul Hodgson, a compensation expert, said “[s]ome of the gains are hu-
mongous” and predicted that they would continue in 2011.100 
Companies that issue huge amounts of stock and options to their ex-
ecutives dilute the wealth left over for their shareholders. As one astute 
investment adviser put it, “[w]hen compensation is excessive, that should 
be a red flag .... Does the company exist for the benefit of shareholders or 
insiders? ... Stock-based compensation plans are often nothing more than 
legalized front-running, insider trading and stock watering all wrapped 
into one package.”101 
By that standard, shareholders and the investing public are particularly 
ill-served today by the stewards of their wealth. While many businesses 
that were hard hit by the recession have been doing better lately, top corpo-
rate officers seem to be raking off a larger and larger share of that increased 
wealth, getting hefty raises and multimillion-dollar paychecks. Philippe P. 
Dauman of Viacom, Ray R. Irani of Occidental Petroleum, and Lawrence 
J. Ellison of Oracle were near the top of that list with compensation last 
year of $84.5 million, $76.1 million, and $70.1 million respectively.102 John 
Hammergren the CEO of McKesson Corp., a healthcare services firm, was 
at its head taking down $150.7 million.103 
In addition, nearly obscene severance arrangements compound these 
outrageous annual payments. The aforementioned Mr. Hammergren will get 
$469 million from his company if there is a change in managerial control.104 
In September 2011, Leo Apotheker, Hewlett-Packard’s CEO, resigned after 
serving just eleven months.105 Even though the company’s stock dropped 
50% during his tenure,106 he took with him a golden parachute of $13.2 
million in severance pay on top of a signing package worth $10 million.107 
That however was chump change compared to relatively recent golden 
parachutes in excess of $200 million each for Hank McKinnell of Pfizer 
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and Robert Nardelli of Home Depot,108 and a $46 million bonus in ad-
vance of $3.4 million in severance awarded to Adam Metz last year after 
just two years at General Growth Properties, a land trust.109 This past year, 
General Growth Properties collapsed in one of our country’s largest com-
mercial real estate bankruptcies.110 
One also cannot overlook the lush benefits these emperors of industry 
receive. The most notorious perquisite was the estimated $700,000 worth 
of unreported corporate jet usage by Eugene Isenberg, the CEO of Nabors 
Industries during 2009–2010.111 The Wall Street Journal discovered that 
he often flew on the company plane to his homes in Palm Beach, Florida 
and Martha’s Vineyard, Massachusetts.112 
VI. LEGAL RESPONSES BEFORE SAY-ON-PAY 
A. Case Law 
Opponents of excessive executive compensation scored an early victory 
at the U.S. Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Rogers v. Hill.113 In 1930, 
during the Great Depression, the president of the American Tobacco Company 
was paid salary and bonuses over $1 million based on a provision in the 
company’s by-laws that entitled him to 2.5% of the firm’s profits.114 While 
the compensation arising from that formula had not been excessive when 
it was adopted two decades earlier, in subsequent years there had been what 
the court called an “enormous increase in the company’s profits” that re-
sulted in what for that time was exorbitant remuneration.115 Because the top 
executive’s pay had gotten so large, the Court held that the complaining 
shareholder had successfully stated a claim of waste.116 In justification for 
that holding it quoted these remarks from Judge Thomas Swan, a distin-
guished jurist of that era, who dissented in the lower court’s opinion: “If a 
bonus payment has no relation to the value of services for which it is given, 
it is in reality a gift in part and the majority stockholders have no power to 
give away corporate property against the protest of the minority.”117 
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A later case arising out the same situation however set quite a different 
tone for those actions and proved, until recently, to be the more influential.118 
There, the Court called those same payments 
munificent. To the person of moderate income they would be princely—
perhaps something unattainable; to the wage earner eking out an existence 
they would be fabulous and the unemployed might regard them as fan-
tastic, if not criminal. To others they would seem immoral, inexcusably un-
equal and an indictment of our economic system.119 
Yet noting that a majority of the shareholders had recently ratified the 
payments,120 the Court cited its “reluctance ... to interfere with the internal 
management of a corporation.”121 Stating that “[c]ourts are ill-equipped to 
solve or even to grapple with these entangled economic problems,”122 it 
dismissed the action. 
In the post–World War II era the influential Delaware Supreme Court 
followed this approach showing little interest in overturning a compensa-
tion plan that had been approved by disinterested and independent direc-
tors as beneficial to the company and ratified by its shareholders.123 In the 
2006 Disney case,124 the Delaware High Court refused to set aside a lucra-
tive severance deal for the dismissed president of the company, Michael 
Ovitz. Disney however involved payments made under an employment 
contract entered into before Mr. Ovitz went to work for the company, not 
big jumps in pay given to an already-employed corporate official.125 
By contrast, in a more recent case from Delaware,126 Chancellor Chandler 
refused to dismiss a waste claim against Citigroup’s CEO, Charles Prince, 
who was responsible for billions of dollars of losses by that company dur-
ing the financial meltdown. After stating the general authority of boards to 
set executive compensation, the Chancellor made this telling comment: 
It is also well settled in our law, however, that the discretion of di-
rectors in setting executive compensation is not unlimited. Indeed, the 
Delaware Supreme Court was clear when it stated that “there is an outer 
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limit” to the board’s discretion to set executive compensation, “at which 
point a decision of the directors on executive compensation is so dis-
proportionately large as to be unconscionable and constitute waste.”127 
The Chancellor went on to examine the allegations that Mr. Prince had been 
paid $68 million upon departing from his top position at Citigroup in 2007 
after the housing market had crashed.128 The Chancellor found that the share-
holders raised reasonable doubt as to whether Citi’s board was well-informed, 
careful, and rational in approving that compensation plan.129 
B. SEC Disclosure Requirements 
On the federal front, since its beginnings in the 1930s the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has used its regulatory power under the secu-
rities laws130 to compel disclosure of executive and director compensation 
by public companies. Acting on its mandate to provide helpful informa-
tion to investors, the Commission has amended its requirements for public 
company reporting periodically in response to changing forms of corpo-
rate remuneration.131 
In 2006, shortly after options-backdating scandals became public, the 
SEC issued a revision of its compensation rules, changing previous require-
ments for disclosing backdating.132 To promote annual and intercompany 
comparisons, in 1992 the Commission mandated a tabular format for disclos-
ing backdating.133 The 2006 standards refined that approach and required 
that company officials explain their remuneration policies in a narrative 
analysis called Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A).134 Other 
new SEC provisions called for tabular presentations of senior executive 
compensation over a three-year period, which must include equity-based 
awards and amounts realized from those holdings as well as potential post-
employment payments.135 When publishing those regulations, the Director 
of the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance gave this reason for those rules: 
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Investors will now be provided with one number for total annual compen-
sation for each named executive officer. The clarity and comparability 
of this one number will be complemented by the principles-based narra-
tive disclosures in our new Compensation Discussion and Analysis section 
and by the requirement that these disclosures be made in plain English.136 
Some commentators thought that more extensive disclosure requirements 
for compensation would shame corporate officials into showing some re-
straint, but that hardly seems to have been the result.137 Rather, greedy ex-
ecutives now appear to be using that disclosure as a benchmark to ratchet 
up their own pay by arguing that their remuneration should be at that level 
or better.138 As one commentator put it: 
Chief executives tend to view themselves as residents of Lake Wobegon, 
where all children are above average .... The compensation details of their 
counterparts provides them with the leverage to request a higher amount 
from boards. The result: each year executive pay rises ever higher and the 
industry average is reset.139 
C. Comments by Scholars and Public Officials 
Two prolific and renowned scholars of business law, Professor Lucian 
Bebchuk and Judge Richard Posner, have also weighed in with very criti-
cal comments on the current state of corporate remuneration, as has the re-
spected Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) Special Master, Kenneth 
Feinberg.140 In a 2004 book with Professor Jesse Fried, Pay Without Perfor-
mance, Bebchuk attacked what he called the “official view” that directors 
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fix executive pay in arm’s-length negotiations with executives in order to 
provide incentive for those officials to increase shareholder wealth.141 In 
reality, Bebchuk and others argue, corporate leaders set their own pay 
through captured boards.142 
While Bebchuk declined to pass judgment on the high levels of execu-
tive pay, he levied heavy fire on their failure to provide any real incentives 
to corporate management. They are, he said, “compensation practices that 
obscure the amount and performance insensitivity of pay ....”143 His point 
was thus a modern restatement of economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s 
famous dictum, “[t]he salary of the chief executive of the large corporation 
is not a market award for achievement. It is frequently in the nature of a 
warm personal gesture by the individual to himself.”144 
In 2008, the country suffered a devastating financial meltdown brought 
on by the collapse of debt obligations collateralized by inflated real estate 
values.145 The federal government stepped in with an enormously expensive 
bailout of banks that had created and dealt in those speculative securities.146 
In October 2009, Kenneth Feinberg, the special master appointed to over-
see executive compensation for banks receiving these so-called TARP funds, 
ruled that the twenty-five most highly paid executives at those institutions 
would have their pay capped at $500,000.147 When asked if he anticipated 
that his ruling would more broadly change the practices of executive pay, 
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Feinberg replied, “I hope so.”148 That advice, however, has not been heeded 
by corporate America. 
In the wake of the financial crisis, Bebchuk and co-authors presented 
evidence that executive pay arrangements such as stock options encour-
aged excessive risk taking that ultimately had deleterious effects on the 
economy.149 Executives at two large financial firms that collapsed in the 
meltdown, Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers, cashed out and kept large, 
so-called performance-based compensation that they garnered in the dec-
ade before the crash.150 Bebchuk and Fried followed up with another article 
discussing ways that executives’ compensation can be genuinely tied to the 
long-term performance of their firms by generally requiring that manage-
ment hold equity grants for the long term.151 Another commentator sug-
gested that the same result is currently achieved by firms that substitute 
grants of restricted stock for options.152 
Judge Posner, the father of Law and Economics, made similar critical 
comments recently, stating, “[t]he problem of executive compensation is not 
only real; it is more serious than I believed it to be ....”153 First he saw it as 
a problem of agency costs, that is, excessive amounts paid by owners of a 
business to those who manage it.154 With “the uncertainty that surrounds 
success in business,”155 it is very difficult, Posner said, to evaluate the per-
formance of a CEO and therefore to say that she has really earned her pay. 
Even if there was a reliable method of sizing up the work of a top cor-
porate official, Posner said, boards generally would be unable to apply it 
                                                 
148 Joe Nocera, Pay Cuts, But Little Headway in What Matters Most, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 
2009, at B1. 
149 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of Failure: 
Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 
257, 274–76 (2010). Another commentator made the same comments even more bluntly: 
An officer with stock options has an incentive to move corporate assets 
from stable, low-volatility investments into high-risk investments because 
that enhances the value of his options. An option holder does not partici-
pate in losses, although the underlying assets of the corporation collapse. 
A corporation that has given its managers substantial options has given 
them incentives to invest in highly volatile, even suicidal, investments, which 
should scare the pants off shareholders. 
Calvin H. Johnson, Corporate Meltdowns Caused by Compensatory Stock Options, TAX 
NOTES, May 16, 2011, at 738. 
150 See Bebchuk, Cohen & Spamann, supra note 149, at 276. 
151 See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 140, at 1919–20. 
152 See David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of 
Optimal Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611, 667–68 (2011). 
153 Posner, supra note 138, at 1014. 
154 See id. at 1015–16. 
155 Id. at 1018. 
22 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:001 
to the CEO at their firms.156 Directors generally come from the ranks of 
executives at other companies and thus have a vested interest in keeping 
the compensation of similarly situated officials high.157 In addition, since 
CEOs influence the choice and pay of directors, “there is evidence of mu-
tual back scratching—the directors authorizing generous compensation for 
the CEO and the CEO supporting generous fees for the directors.”158 
Posner also found that so-called incentive compensation for executives, 
such as stock options, are not well aligned with the CEO’s performance 
because “[m]any things move a company’s stock besides the decisions of its 
CEO.”159 He also cited the common practice of repricing executive options 
when a company’s stock has fallen and compared it to backdating, which, 
he said, is only a clandestine approach to achieve the same result.160 Both 
allow the recipients to reap large gains from stock appreciation. 
Judge Posner concluded that the social costs of excessive compensa-
tion are very disturbing, stating that “[t]he redistributive effects are obvi-
ous and are troubling from an ethical standpoint because, by definition, 
overcompensation is a kind of theft from shareholders.”161 Another current 
commentator echoed those sentiments and expressed similar doubts about 
the validity of top corporate pay, in whatever form it takes: 
I believe that interactions between executives and companies can be 
characterized as struggles between hyper-interested and very well orga-
nized minorities, i.e., the executives, and relatively disinterested and ex-
tremely disorganized majorities, i.e., the shareholders as represented by 
boards of directors. Executives will prevail in such struggles every time. 
Inevitably, the end products of such struggles will be contracts that have 
more to do with optimal looting than with optimal incentive creation.162 
VII. THE COMING OF SAY-ON-PAY 
The famed study of Professors Berle and Means published in 1932 estab-
lished that the control of public companies is effectively separated from its 
far-flung shareholder-owners and is lodged in a self-perpetuating managerial 
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class.163 As one leading corporate critic put it, “[i]t’s one of the great anom-
alies of our ownership society: shareholders own companies, but execu-
tives can easily slap them down. The hired help, in other words, holds the 
cards.”164 Starting from at least the Watergate scandals of the 1970s, there 
have been widespread movements to reform corporate governance practices 
so that officers and directors are held more accountable to their shareholders 
and the public.165 Yet those efforts seem to have produced little success. 
As public awareness of this exorbitant compensation grew, however, 
investor groups and other activists began demanding shareholder input on 
those decisions.166 Under pressure, a few firms voluntarily afforded stock-
holders a Say-on-Pay vote. Congressional action to mandate Say-on-Pay 
measures at all public companies began with a bill introduced by Con-
gressman Barney Frank in 2007.167 In 2009, that Congressional action 
morphed into a law requiring all firms receiving TARP assistance to hold 
such a vote.168 Finally, after a lengthy legislative process to address the 
causes of the financial meltdown, Congress included a provision in the 
omnibus Dodd-Frank Act giving shareholders in all public companies a 
nonbinding vote on the compensation received by their executives.169 With 
President Obama’s signature, it became law in July 2010.170 
The Dodd-Frank Say-on-Pay measure added a new subsection to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 entitled “Shareholder Approval of Exec-
utive Compensation.”171 It requires that public companies hold sharehold-
er advisory votes on the executive compensation described in their proxy 
statements at least once every three years.172 This resolution in the proxy 
statements does not need any special language. The Dodd-Frank Say-on-
Pay measure also mandates that at the first annual meeting after its enact-
ment, the shareholders elect how frequently they will take these votes—at 
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a one-, two-, or three-year interval.173 This is the so-called “Say-When-on-
Pay” vote. A separate advisory vote is also required on severance arrange-
ments under a golden parachute provision.174 
The law also includes a “Rule of Construction.”175 It may not be interpreted: 
(1) as overruling a decision by such issuer or board of directors; 
(2) to create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of such issuer 
or board of directors; 
(3) to create or imply any additional fiduciary duties for such issuer or 
board of directors; or 
(4) to restrict or limit the ability of shareholders to make proposals for 
inclusion in proxy materials related to executive compensation.176 
The SEC followed up with its own regulations implementing Say-on-Pay.177 
It requires that the results of those votes be reported promptly to the public 
on Form 8-K.178 It also mandates that each firm’s narrative disclosure in 
future proxy statements must explain when those results were taken into 
account in future compensation decisions.179 
A similar Say-on-Pay provision has existed since 2004 in the United 
Kingdom where it has constrained executive pay at poorly performing 
firms.180 This led one commentator to propose that such a vote would be 
more effective if taken ex ante, that is, as a review of the pay package of a 
prospective CEO rather than ex post, as a referendum on whether perfor-
mance warranted the already awarded pay package.181 
Shareholders under the regime established by Dodd-Frank, he argued, 
also might be reluctant to cast a negative vote on exorbitant compensation at 
a well-performing firm for fear of offending its management.182 The com-
mentator also surmised that in its present form as an after-the-fact advisory 
vote, the principal harm to directors of a negative Say-on-Pay vote would 
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be reputational, although it could also signal an implicit threat to remove 
directors at their re-elections or through a proxy contest.183 
VIII. SAY-ON-PAY: THE FIRST YEAR AND BEYOND 
When Say-on-Pay went into effect in early 2011, one commentator as-
sessed some of its early votes and predicted that the measure would have 
“a transformative impact on the relationship between chief executives and 
institutional investors.”184 After a full year’s operation, however, the re-
sults are more mixed. By June, at the end of the spring proxy season in 
which a large majority of public companies held their annual meetings, 
shareholders casting Say-on-Pay votes had overwhelmingly approved the 
executive compensation at their companies.185 Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS), a leading shareholder advocate, recommended a negative 
vote at 293 companies.186 Yet a majority of voting shareholders from over 
2,500 firms signaled their approval of the pay packages at all but 39.187 
This amounted to a “Yes” vote at 98.5% of the companies.188 
An editorial therefore called Say-on-Pay “a disappointment” and cited 
this comment on the process from Robert A.G. Monks, a corporate gov-
ernance expert: “[y]ou only have the appearance of reform, and it’s a cruel 
hoax.”189 In the same vein, another commentator said, “[t]he latest ‘say on 
pay’ endeavor has turned into a costly exercise that validates almost every 
companies’ [sic] pay practices.”190 
Yet the same expert noted that the reforms were not futile.191 Some 
companies foresaw shareholder criticism and changed their pay arrange-
ments ahead of the votes.192 Almost 80% of companies on the Russell 
3000 index endorsed annual votes rather than every 2 or 3 years, and there 
was also evidence that instead of “the country club back-slapping of earlier 
years,” pay scales were being more closely tied to company performance.193 
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Other observers cited similar promising outcomes. Some companies, 
like General Electric, that had originally received negative recommendations 
from ISS changed their compensation policies and secured its approval,194 
and many companies made changes in their compensation programs in an-
ticipation of the first round of Say-on-Pay votes.195 Additionally Lynn Turner, 
former chief accountant for the SEC, explained the positive ballots by not-
ing that “mutual funds, which own 70 percent of U.S. equities and are many 
companies’ biggest shareholders,” often have contracts with corporations to 
manage their employees’ 401(k) plans.196 As such, “[t]he big mutual fund 
companies ‘won’t vote against management on compensation unless they’re 
really bad.’”197 
Another observer counseled firms not to take the wrong message from 
this first year of voting because “institutional investors said they reserved 
their ‘No’ votes for particularly egregious compensation practices. They felt 
that too many ‘No’ votes would ‘dilute the effectiveness of voting against 
the pay plans ....’”198 
Along the same lines, recent polling data demonstrates that “an over-
whelming majority [of institutional investors] expect[] the number of com-
panies with majority ‘No’ votes to increase in 2012.”199 With that in mind, a 
large majority of companies are reviewing the results of the 2011 vote to see 
if they should make changes in their compensation plans in anticipation of 
the 2012 ballot.200 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP determined that share-
holders had particular concerns that led them to vote “No” in Say-on-Pay 
votes in 2011, including “‘cherry-picking’ of performance metrics from 
year to year[,] ‘[m]ake-up’ cash and equity awards when the plans do not 
pay out because executives didn’t reach performance targets[,] [e]xecutive 
perquisites[, and] [c]ompensation levels that are facially ‘too high.’”201 
Negative votes may also increase in 2012 because of new SEC disclo-
sure rules expected to go into effect during the year.202 Chief among them 
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will be a requirement that companies state the ratio of their CEO’s pay to 
that of their median employee.203 This will quite bluntly mandate that firms 
“put in black-and-white that the CEO makes umpteen [sic] times more than 
the median total compensation for all employees in the organization.”204 
Republicans in Congress, however, and their allies who lobby for Wall 
Street, have made a strong push to repeal or cut back the reforms of Dodd-
Frank. One former senator called their support “the most uneven battle since 
Little Big Horn.”205 Business groups, emboldened by a judicial decision in 
July 2011 striking down the SEC’s proxy access rule, might also bring to 
court challenges to all or parts of Dodd-Frank.206 By contrast, a senior 
Obama official speaking of the upcoming presidential election said that 
the President would make the legislation “one of the central elements of 
the campaign.”207 “One of the main elements of the contrast will be that 
the president passed Wall Street reform and our opponent and the other 
party want to repeal it.”208 
IX. SAY-ON-PAY VOTES AS EVIDENCE OF BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
A. Preliminary Considerations 
Under the internal affairs doctrine, officers and directors owe duties to 
their shareholders. These duties are determined by the states where the 
firm is incorporated.209 In addition, all states place the power to manage a 
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corporation under the supervision of its board of directors.210 Congress, 
therefore, had to make Say-on-Pay votes advisory or else it would be im-
pinging on the prerogative of state jurisdiction. 
One conservative legal scholar, Steven Bainbridge, thus went on the 
record with this dismissive view of potential lawsuits based on such neg-
ative votes: 
In state law, executive compensation decisions by the board of directors 
is [sic] subject to the business judgment rule, making shareholder pay law-
suits extremely hard to win .... The act and its legislative history further 
make clear that the votes shall not be deemed either to effect or affect the 
fiduciary duties of directors. ... It’ll be interesting to see what legal theories 
these plaintiffs [sic] lawyers come up with .... Surely they won’t have the 
brass balls to claim that say on pay is binding, will they?211 
Despite Professor Bainbridge’s comments doubting the resolve of share-
holder lawyers, by September 2011 at least seven derivative suits were filed 
against senior executives, directors, and their compensation consultants over 
negative Say-on-Pay votes.212 They all alleged that courts should excuse as 
futile the preliminary requirement for pre-suit demand on the board, because 
those directors had already approved the questionable compensation.213 
The suits did not challenge the directors’ and officers’ duty of care which 
would be protected by the business judgment rule and exculpatory provisions 
such as Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Corporate Code.214 Instead, they 
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alleged that the “No” votes reflected the “independent business judgment” 
of shareholders that the pay was not in the interest of their firms and they 
attacked the compensation decisions as breaches of the duties of loyalty 
and good faith owed by corporate officials to their shareholders.215 
Astute commentators pointed out that recent Delaware decisions had 
laid the groundwork for such claims.216 In Gantler v. Stephens, Delaware’s 
High Court ruled that corporate officers have the same fiduciary duties as 
directors.217 A few years earlier, the Chancellor had found that a CEO vio-
lated his duty of loyalty when negotiating a compensation agreement with 
his company.218 Unlike Mr. Ovitz in Disney who was bargaining for his 
first employment contract,219 the CEO here was already the top official of 
the firm and thus likely to receive a sweetheart deal.220 
B. Cincinnati Bell 
Commentators therefore should not have been so quick to call these 
Say-on-Pay suits frivolous.221 On the contrary, it should have been appar-
ent that they had the potential to really “shake up a boardroom.”222 In Sep-
tember 2011, a U.S. District Court refused to dismiss a Say-on-Pay suit by 
automatically acceding to the business judgment of directors.223 Instead, 
confirming the potential of Say-on-Pay suits, the court ruled that whether 
such deference was warranted would be a question for trial. The court also 
excused the requirement that shareholders make a pre-suit demand.224 
The case involved $4 million in bonuses given to the CEO of Cincinnati 
Bell, Inc., “on top of $4.5 million in salary and other compensation.”225 
Cincinnati Bell’s board took that action despite “a $61.3 million decline in 
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net income, a drop in earnings per share from $0.37 to $0.09, a reduction in 
share price from $3.45 to $2.80, and a negative 18.8% annual shareholder 
return.”226 In light of that poor performance it should have been no sur-
prise that the company’s shareholders registered a 66% “No” vote against 
the CEO’s increased pay package.227 
The shareholder plaintiff brought the suit alleging that the directors 
had breached their duty of loyalty in awarding the bonuses.228 To establish 
liability, a shareholder has to meet a high standard of culpability under Ohio 
law. It requires a showing of “a deliberate intent to cause injury to the cor-
poration or reckless disregard for the best interests of the corporation.”229 
Even though informed decisions on compensation by disinterested directors 
are presumed to be the product of a valid business judgment, the Cincinnati 
Bell court found that the plaintiff had adequately pled facts showing that 
protection might not be available in that case.230 
The court justified its ruling by citing the company’s own pay-for-
performance policy.231 It held that there was therefore a plausible claim the 
“multi-million dollar bonuses approved ... in a the time of the company’s 
declining financial performance ... were not in the best interests of Cincinnati 
Bell’s shareholders and therefore constituted an abuse of discretion and/or 
bad faith.”232 
In its lengthy first footnote, the court gave an indication of how the neg-
ative Say-on-Pay suit impacted its decision.233 There the court observed 
that some commentators have identified excessive executive compensation 
as the “[n]o. 1 problem in corporate governance.”234 It then went on to cite 
various statistics describing how CEO pay has far outstripped average 
wages and how the misdistribution of earnings and wealth in our country 
has grown to alarming proportions.235 
It then noted that Congress had passed Dodd-Frank with its Say-on-
Pay provision “against this backdrop.”236 Next it noted that, 
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[a]lthough Dodd-Frank states that those [votes] are not binding and do 
not alter the fiduciary duties of directors, some commentators opine that 
“[a] negative say-on-pay vote gives the court evidence that there’s been a 
breach of duty. It doesn’t mean there’s been a breach of duty, but it can 
support a finding of breach.”237 
Finally, turning the fear of frivolous litigation on its head, the court cited a 
report that as of June 2011 shareholders had disapproved of executive pay 
in only 1.6% of public companies that took Say-on-Pay votes.238 In a terse 
following comment the court stated, “Cincinnati Bell is one of those com-
panies,” signaling that it considered the shareholders’ negative vote as evi-
dence of misconduct.239 
C. Beazer Homes 
A Georgia trial court, however, has dismissed a similar shareholder 
suit.240 The case involved Beazer Homes USA Inc. (Beazer), whose four 
most highly compensated executives received pay raises even though the 
company suffered a $34 million loss and a -17.23% share price return for 
fiscal year 2010.241 That continued in a three-year pattern of poor perfor-
mance, during which Beazer lagged behind peer companies.242 Yet the 
firm’s CEO received total remuneration of $6,893,362 in 2010, up approx-
imately $450,000 from the previous year.243 That compensation package 
drew a 54% negative Say-on-Pay vote at the company’s annual meeting of 
shareholders in February 2011.244 
In reporting the vote, Beazer stated: “[o]ur core compensation objec-
tive continues to be that we will pay for performance—we believe that we 
should pay higher compensation when our management team succeeds 
and lower compensation when it does not.”245 Yet the company went on to 
justify the greater pay in 2010 by citing “the highly unique set of circum-
stances facing the Company at the start and during most of fiscal 2009.”246 
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Beazer also explained the jump in pay by noting that the executives’ com-
pensation had been frozen for some time, that their bonuses had been re-
duced in recent years, and that no equity awards had been made to them in 
the last two years.247 
According to the Company’s 2010 proxy, however, Beazer was under 
criminal and civil investigations by the Department of Justice that pre-
cluded it from offering such equity-based grants.248 Since the company’s 
top officials were presumably responsible for those potential law viola-
tions, shareholders, as evidenced by their negative vote, may well have felt 
that Beazer’s leaders suffered no injustice in being deprived of those 
awards and there was no need that the awards be given now. 
Beazer was an egregious situation of unearned compensation, and man-
agement’s justifications for it were disingenuous. The company’s share-
holders therefore quite logically signaled their disapproval. Yet in contrast 
to the Cincinnati Bell decision, the Beazer Court refused to excuse pre-suit 
demand, finding that the complaint failed to allege particularized facts 
raising doubt that “the challenged compensation decisions were made in 
good faith and in [sic] directors’ honest belief that the decisions were in 
Beazer’s best interests.”249 In other words, according to the Court, the al-
legations had not raised “a reasonable doubt that the Beazer directors’ de-
cisions ... reflected valid business judgments.”250 The Beazer Court also 
supported its decision by noting that Delaware law had long granted “wide 
discretion” to boards to set executive compensation and Dodd-Frank had 
specifically preserved that “fiduciary duty framework concerning direc-
tors’ executive compensation decisions.”251 
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X. SAY-ON-PAY’S BROADER IMPACT ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 
According to a recent survey of investors, executive pay continues to 
be one of their top concerns—particularly when that remuneration is sig-
nificantly higher than peer levels and disproportionate to the company’s 
performance.252 Suits against boards for authorizing excessive compensa-
tion therefore will continue, bolstered by the Cincinnati Bell decision, 
which cites negative Say-on-Pay votes as prime evidence of such a breach 
of fiduciary duty. 
Facing such a specter of potential liability, one commentator starkly 
advised that directors might finally “sit down and do the math.”253 Up until 
now, he noted, they have not been evaluating what options-awards might 
cost the company when the stock price goes up.254 Even more significantly, 
he said, directors “who typically owe their position on the board to the chief 
executive”255 might finally have a countervailing incentive to do their job 
and check their top executives’ demands for exorbitant compensation. 
Underlying this legal change is the moral sense that these huge executive 
pay packages are a grave injustice, a real theft of our productive resources. 
All religious traditions condemn the evil that results when great wealth is mis-
appropriated, and American history is full of lessons that we all rise or fall 
together as a people. As President Kennedy put it, “[i]f a free society cannot 
help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.”256 
Closely related to the misuse of corporate wealth by excessive compen-
sation is the equally troubling phenomenon of corporations hoarding large 
amounts of cash and not distributing those funds to shareholders or putting 
them to other productive uses.257 Two trillion dollars of these funds currently 
lie in corporate treasuries, with firms showing little interest in spending them 
to create jobs for workers258 that would spur economic recovery.259 In addi-
tion, the revival of the American manufacturing base requires expenditures 
in science, engineering, and technology.260 With debt issues paramount in 
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Washington, experts expect a 10% cut in federal grants for research and 
development,261 making private sector spending even more imperative. 
In short, the underuse of firm resources, along with their blatant mis-
use by excessive executive compensation, is robbing companies and their 
shareholders of funds that should be working to expand the profitable ca-
pacities of the nation and giving productive work to its citizens. As a lead-
ing treatise on corporate governance puts it when discussing the proper 
purposes of those firms, “[t]he accountability we still seek ... is that which 
is most likely to result in corporate choices that best benefit society over 
the long term.”262 
A prime example of that beneficial attitude comes from one of the 
great geniuses of American business, Henry Ford. By the second decade 
of the 20th century, Ford’s Motor Company had already become quite 
profitable.263 Ford planned to use some of those funds as a reserve so he 
could lower the price of his cars, but some of his early shareholders, the 
Dodge brothers, objected.264 They sued Ford, charging that they were get-
ting insufficient dividends. Ford offered this defense of his business plan: 
“[m]y ambition ... is to employ still more men; to spread the benefits of 
this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build 
up their lives and their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share 
of our profits back into the business.”265 This defense of his business plan 
was in line with Ford’s oft-stated aspiration to pay everyone who worked 
at his plant well enough to purchase one of the cars they helped make.266 
The court however seemed to find Ford’s rhetoric too philanthropic. In 
holding that Ford must pay more dividends to the Dodge Brothers it stated, 
“[t]here should be no confusion .... A business corporation is organized 
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”267 Yet the 
court also acknowledged the discretion that the law would allow to direc-
tors to accomplish that purpose.268 If Ford had thus justified his price-
reduction policies as a way of creating a permanent market for his product, 
the result would most likely have been different. His statement about the 
broader corporate purposes would then have been very acceptable when 
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seen as creating wide desire for a product that only well-paid consumers 
could satisfy.269 
The need for such broad based buyer demand is even greater today 
when our nation’s recovery staggers along. As economist Robert Reich 
stated, “The economy cannot possibly get out of its current doldrums 
without a strategy to revive the purchasing power of America’s vast mid-
dle class.”270 Economic growth will thus come when corporate funds are 
used for job-creating investments, rather than hoarded or lavishly paid out 
to overcompensated executives. 
CONCLUSION 
Cases like Citigroup and Cincinnati Bell are evidence of a renewed ju-
dicial willingness to find boards of directors liable for breaches of their 
fiduciary duty if they have granted overly generous pay hikes to top offi-
cials. This may be particularly so when shareholders have stated their dis-
approval of those awards by negative Say-on-Pay votes, especially when 
those lush raises have been granted despite losses and in derogation of 
corporate policy that executive pay be based on performance. 
Although the negative Say-on-Pay votes are not legally binding on 
boards, they are nevertheless probative evidence that directors have vio-
lated their duty to act in the best interest of their shareholders. Courts can 
act with rulings that will send a much-needed message to boards that they 
must curb excessive pay packages for top management. Then, by distrib-
uting those funds to shareholders or putting them to other productive uses, 
business leaders can roll back some of the outlandish income inequality 
that is plaguing our nation. 
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